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European loans: Built for what comes next

Portfolio managers Tim Elliot and David Huang discuss why European loans may be well-structured to withstand a period of uncertainty.

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5 May 2026
9 minute read

Key takeaways:

  • Rate insurance: Floating-rate coupons of approximately 7.1% mean loan income adjusts upward if the ECB hikes, and holds steady if it doesn’t. With OIS markets pricing roughly two-and-a-half hikes by early 2027 but the path far from certain, floating-rate exposure removes the need to take a directional view on rates.
  • Defensive positioning: Approximately 57% of the European loan market sits in non-cyclical sectors, compared with just 20% for high yield. In a weakening macro environment, this composition – reinforced by floating-rate mechanics and a CLO-anchored investor base – can deliver a more predictable return profile.
  • Adequate compensation: European loan spreads sit near their 10-year median (52nd percentile), while high yield bonds trade at decade-tights (10th percentile). Within single-B, 3-year discount margins range from 351 to 629 basis points, offering comparable or wider compensation than equivalently rated bonds for senior, secured exposure.

The European macro outlook has weakened since the start of 2026, leaving both future inflation and growth more uncertain. The Iran conflict pushed energy costs higher, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised eurozone growth down to 1.1%, and energy-driven inflation has put European Central Bank (ECB) hikes back on the agenda.1 For credit investors, these crosscurrents demand assets whose structural features can deliver across multiple scenarios. European leveraged loans – a broadly syndicated market now comparable in size to European high yield, with deep secondary liquidity – offer three such advantages.

Rate insurance: income that adjusts to the policy path

European loans pay a floating coupon, typically referenced to three-month EURIBOR plus a credit spread. With EURIBOR at 2.17% and the Western European Leveraged Loan Index (WELLI) 3-year discount margin at 496 basis points, the all-in coupon on a representative European loan is approximately 7.1%.1 That income is not trivial – it provides a meaningful carry cushion through periods of volatility.

The ECB cut rates eight times between June 2024 and June 2025, bringing down the deposit facility rate from 4.00% to 2.00%, and has held rates steady since.1 But the rate path has shifted. Energy-driven inflation following the Iran conflict has put hikes back on the agenda – overnight index swap (OIS) markets price a 78% probability of a hike at the June meeting, with roughly two-and-a-half cumulative hikes implied by early 2027, though a terminal rate of approximately 2.6% would be far from extreme.1 There is no guarantee these hikes will materialise. But that uncertainty is precisely the point.

For loan investors, the floating-rate structure provides insurance: if the ECB hikes, EURIBOR rises and every loan coupon adjusts upward automatically – the opposite of fixed-rate bonds, where higher rates mean capital losses. If rates stay on hold, investors continue to earn the current all-in yield of approximately 7.1%. Either way, the spread component – at 496 basis points, the majority of the return – is unaffected. In an environment where the direction of rates is genuinely uncertain, floating-rate exposure removes the need to take a view. What remains is pure credit risk – the spread that compensates investors for the borrower’s fundamentals. For managers focused on the single-B segment, this is a meaningful advantage: the return on a loan portfolio is driven entirely by credit selection and the strength of issuers’ balance sheets, not by the direction of policy rates.

Defensive positioning: lower cyclicality where it counts

European loans have historically exhibited lower return volatility than high yield bonds, despite carrying lower average credit ratings (the loan index is predominantly single-B rated, versus a more even BB/B split in high yield). In 2022, when rising rates punished fixed income broadly, European loans declined 3.3% on a total return basis while eurozone high yield fell 11.7% – a gap of more than 800 basis points.2 The explanation is structural: floating-rate coupons compress the range of return outcomes, and the CLO-dominated investor base – with reinvestment mandates that sustain buying through sell-offs – limits the procyclical redemption dynamics that amplify bond market volatility.

Sector composition reinforces the defensive tilt. Applying Janus Henderson’s proprietary gross domestic product (GDP) sensitivity classifiers – which categorise 79 Bloomberg subsectors into non-cyclical, semi-cyclical, and highly cyclical buckets based on earnings sensitivity to economic growth – the contrast between the two markets is stark. Approximately 57% of the European loan market by market value falls into the non-cyclical category (healthcare, business services, food and beverage, telecom, gaming), compared with just 20% of the European high yield bond market. Conversely, 51% of EU high yield sits in highly cyclical sectors (consumer discretionary, autos, chemicals, basic industry), versus 25% for loans.3

Figure 1: Sector cyclicality composition, EU loans vs EU high yield (as at 23 April 2026)

GDP sensitivity EU loans (WELLI) EU high yield (HPIC)
Non-cyclical 57% 20%
Semi-cylical 18% 29%
Highly cylical 25% 51%

Source: S&P/UBS (WELLI sector composition), ICE BofA HPIC constituents. Cyclicality mapping based on Janus Henderson Investors’ proprietary GDP sensitivity framework applied to Bloomberg subsector classifications. As at 23 April 2026. Weights may vary over time.

This is not coincidental. Private equity sponsors – who originate the vast majority of leveraged loans – deliberately target businesses with predictable, recurring cash flows that can service debt through economic cycles. The resulting index composition favours healthcare, technology services, and commercial services over capital-intensive, commodity-sensitive, or consumer-discretionary sectors. In an environment where macro visibility is limited, both the structural mechanics and the underlying sector composition of the loan market favour a more predictable return profile.

Adequate compensation: loans at fair value, bonds at decade-tights

There is a striking divergence in where spreads sit relative to their own history. The WELLI 3-year discount margin of 496 basis points is near its 10-year median of 494, sitting at the 52nd percentile. By contrast, European high yield at 296 basis points of OAS is at the 10th percentile of its 10-year range. US high yield, at 285, is at the 6th percentile.4

Put simply, a higher percentile means a wider spread – and more income for the same underlying credit risk. At the 52nd percentile, European loans are priced near the middle of their 10-year range: investors are being adequately compensated for the risk they are taking. High yield at the 10th percentile is the opposite – spreads have compressed to levels rarely seen in the past decade, leaving investors with significantly less yield for comparable credit. For active managers, the loan market offers the ability to buy fundamentally sound issuers at spreads that still reflect genuine value.

Figure 2: 10-year spread percentile by asset class (as at 21 April 2026)

Asset class Current spread (bps) Spread type 10Y percentile 10Y median (bps)
EU loans (WELLI) 496 3Y DM 52nd 494
US loans (USLLI) 491 3Y DM 44th 500
EU high yield 296 OAS 10th 347
US high yield 285 OAS 6th 362

Source: Bloomberg, S&P/UBS (WELLI, USLLI), ICE BofA (EU = HPIC, US = H0A0). Percentiles calculated by Janus Henderson Investors using 10 years of data ending 21 April 2026. 3Y DM = 3-year discount margin. OAS = option-adjusted spread. The bigger the spread percentile the wider the spread levels, so a rank of 1st would imply very tight spreads and a rank of 100th very wide spreads. Spreads may vary over time. 

This is where the credit isolation advantage becomes tangible. On a rating-adjusted basis, the single-B segment – where most actively managed loan portfolios are concentrated – is where the opportunity set is richest. EU loan 3-year DMs range from 351 at B1 to 407 at B2 to 629 at B3, a dispersion of 278 basis points within a single rating tier. That dispersion is not noise; it reflects genuine differentiation in credit quality that active managers can exploit.5

Comparing across instruments at the sub-rating level makes the point clearly. At B1, loans offer a 3-year DM of 351 versus an OAS of 252 on equivalently rated high yield bonds – a premium of roughly 100 basis points for a senior, secured position. At B2, loans at 407 sit above HY bonds at 365, a 42 basis point pickup. At B3, loans at 629 exceed HY at 587, a premium of 42 basis points. Across the single-B spectrum, loans consistently offer wider compensation for a higher position in the capital structure.5 Loans are uniformly senior secured, and historically have delivered higher recovery rates in default. High yield bonds, by contrast, are a mix of secured and unsecured obligations – and the unsecured portion, which makes up the majority of the market, has historically recovered materially less.

Figure 3: Sub-rating spread comparison, EU loans vs EU high yield (as at 21 April 2026)

Rating EU loans (3y DM,bps) EU HY bpnds (OAS, bps) Loan premium
BB 285 173 +112
B1 351 252 +99
B2 407 365 +42
B3 629 587 +42

Source: S&P/UBS (WELLI by rating, 3-year discount margin), ICE BofA HPIC constituents (option-adjusted spread by Moody’s sub-rating), Janus Henderson Investors, as at 21-23 April 2026. Spreads may vary over time.

BB-rated loans also offer a meaningful premium – 112 basis points over BB high yield bonds – though this segment represents a smaller share of typical loan portfolios. The wider story is that across every rating bucket, European loans offer comparable or wider spreads than high yield bonds, with the structural advantages of seniority and floating-rate income on top.

Average dollar prices provide an additional angle. European loans currently trade at an average clean price of approximately 95.5.5 The discount to par means loan investors stand to capture price appreciation as loans pull to par at maturity or are refinanced. For a total return investor, this embedded upside complements the carry advantage.

These spread levels are underpinned by a structural demand base with no direct equivalent in flow-driven markets. Collateralised loan obligations account for approximately 65% of demand for European leveraged loans.6 During a CLO’s reinvestment period – typically four to five years – the manager must deploy cash flows from maturing or prepaying loans back into new collateral, regardless of market sentiment. European CLO new issuance reached a record high in 2025, with Deutsche Bank forecasting €65 billion for 2026.7 That pace held through the first quarter despite broader market volatility, as the economics of new deals – the spread earned on loan collateral versus CLO funding costs – remained comfortably positive.7 Sustained CLO issuance translates directly into sustained demand for loans, providing a floor under secondary prices and helping explain why loans have typically performed relatively well during risk-off periods.

Selectivity remains the differentiator

The case for European loans rests on three pillars: floating-rate income that provides insurance against an uncertain rate path, a sector composition that skews defensive in a weakening macro environment, and spread levels that offer adequate compensation where high yield does not. But the current spread range from 351 basis points at B1 to 629 at B3 – a dispersion of 278 basis points within single-B alone – underscores how much credit selection matters.5 An active, bottom-up approach is, in our view, necessary to capture these structural advantages while avoiding names where compensation does not adequately reflect the risk. The question for allocators is not whether the outlook is uncertain. It is whether the assets they hold are structured to withstand that uncertainty. European loans, selected carefully, in our view, offer a credible answer.

 

Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs) are debt securities issued in different tranches, with varying degrees of risk, and backed by an underlying portfolio consisting primarily of below investment grade corporate loans. The return of principal is not guaranteed, and prices may decline if payments are not made timely or credit strength weakens. CLOs are subject to liquidity risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, call risk and the risk of default of the underlying assets.

Fixed income securities are subject to interest rate, inflation, credit and default risk. The bond market is volatile. As interest rates rise, bond prices usually fall, and vice versa. The return of principal is not guaranteed, and prices may decline if an issuer fails to make timely payments or its credit strength weakens.

 

1Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2026.Three-month EURIBOR of 2.17% as at 21 April 2026 (European Money Markets Institute); WELLI 3-year discount margin as at 21 April 2026 (S&P/UBS). ECB rate path: eight cuts between June 2024 and June 2025 (ECB); Morningstar, “ECB Holds Interest Rates Steady After Inflation Undershoots,” 5 February 2026. ECB rate hike probability and implied rate path derived from euro overnight index swap (OIS) pricing as at 24 April 2026: 78% probability of a 25bp hike at the June 2026 meeting; approximately 2.5 cumulative hikes priced by March 2027, implied terminal rate approximately 2.58% (Bloomberg WIRP).

2Source: Bloomberg, 2022 returns for S&P/UBS WELLI Index and ICE BofA HPIC Index, total return in euro. Past performance does not predict future returns.

3Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Cyclicality classification is based on Janus Henderson Investors’ internal GDP sensitivity framework, which maps 79 Bloomberg subsectors (DS201 classification) into non-cyclical, semi-cyclical, and highly cyclical buckets according to historical earnings sensitivity to economic growth. Sector weights for EU loans derived from S&P/UBS WELLI sector composition; sector weights for EU high yield derived from ICE BofA HPIC constituent data joined with Janus Henderson’s FVCM bond universe sector classifications. As at 23 April 2026.

4Source: Bloomberg, European high yield represented by ICE BofA HPIC and US high yield represented by ICE BofA H0A0. Percentiles calculated by Janus Henderson Investors using 10 years of data ending 21 April 2026.

5Source: Janus Henderson Investors, S&P/UBS (WELLI by rating, 3-year discount margin; average clean price). ICE BofA HPIC constituents joined with Janus Henderson FVCM bond universe for option-adjusted spread by Moody’s sub-rating (Ba1–Ba3, B1–B3). EU loan data as at 21 April 2026; EU HY sub-rating OAS at 23 April 2026.

6Source: FCA estimate, 11 November 2025. There is no guaranteed that past trends will continue or forecasts will be realised.

7Source: S&P Global Ratings, 2025 record issuance, 21 January 2026, Deutsche Bank estimates, European CLO Monthly, 1 April 2026, AFME, “European High Yield, Leveraged Loan, and Private Credit Report Q4 2025”, CLO economics data from PitchBook LCD, 18 March 2026.There is no guaranteed that past trends will continue or forecasts will be realised.

ICE BofA European Currency Non-Financial High Yield 2% Constrained Index (HPIC) tracks EUR and GBP denominated below investment grade corporate debt publicly issued in the Eurobond, sterling or euro domestic markets (contains non-financial securities with issuer exposure capped at 2%).

ICE BofA US High Yield Index tracks USD denominated below investment grade corporate debt publicly issued in the US domestic market.

WELLI: The S&P/UBS Western European Leveraged Loan Index (formerly Credit Suisse), the primary benchmark for European leveraged loans.

USLLI: The S&P/UBS Leveraged Loan Index measures the market-value weighted performance of the investable universe of USD-denominated leveraged loans.

CLO (collateralised loan obligation): A securitisation vehicle that pools leveraged loans and issues tranches of debt and equity, representing the largest source of demand in the European loan market.

Discount margin (DM): The average spread over the reference rate (typically EURIBOR) that a floating-rate loan is expected to earn over its remaining life, analogous to OAS for fixed-rate bonds. The 3-year DM assumes a 3-year repayment horizon.

EURIBOR: The Euro Interbank Offered Rate, the reference rate for most European leveraged loan coupons.

Option-adjusted spread (OAS): The spread over the government yield curve after adjusting for any embedded optionality, used as a standard measure of credit compensation for fixed-rate bonds.

Percentile: A statistical measure to express where an observation falls in a range of other observations. A 90th percentile data point, for example, is the value below which 90% of data points fall.

Secured loan: A loan where the borrower has promised to give the lender specific assets if they fail to make repayments.

Queste sono le opinioni dell'autore al momento della pubblicazione e possono differire da quelle di altri individui/team di Janus Henderson Investors. I riferimenti a singoli titoli non costituiscono una raccomandazione all'acquisto, alla vendita o alla detenzione di un titolo, di una strategia d'investimento o di un settore di mercato e non devono essere considerati redditizi. Janus Henderson Investors, le sue affiliate o i suoi dipendenti possono avere un’esposizione nei titoli citati.

 

Le performance passate non sono indicative dei rendimenti futuri. Tutti i dati dei rendimenti includono sia il reddito che le plusvalenze o le eventuali perdite ma sono al lordo dei costi delle commissioni dovuti al momento dell'emissione.

 

Le informazioni contenute in questo articolo non devono essere intese come una guida all'investimento.

 

Non vi è alcuna garanzia che le tendenze passate continuino o che le previsioni si realizzino.

 

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