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Watch now: Lowland Investment Company update

Laura Foll, co-manager of Lowland Investment Company (LWI), joined ShareSoc to provide an update on the trust, as well as her view on the UK market.

Discrete year performance (%) Share price (total return) NAV (total return)
30/06/2024 to 30/06/2025 24.16 16.38
30/06/2023 to 30/06/2024 15.17 16.72
30/06/2022 to 30/06/2023 4.50 5.49
30/06/2021 to 30/06/2022 -9.40 -5.43
30/06/2020 to 30/06/2021 44.64 41.87

All performance, cumulative growth and annual growth data is sourced from Morningstar.

Source: at 30/06/25. © 2025 Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved. The information contained herein: (1) is proprietary to Morningstar and/or its content providers; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete, or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance does not predict future returns.

Balance sheet

A financial statement that summarises a company’s assets, liabilities and shareholders’ equity at a particular point in time. Each segment gives investors an idea as to what the company owns and owes, as well as the amount invested by shareholders. It is called a balance sheet because of the accounting equation: assets = liabilities + shareholders’ equity.

Disinflation

A decrease in the price of goods and services across the economy, usually indicating that the economy is weakening. It differs from ‘disinflation’, which implies a decrease in the level of inflation. Deflation is the opposite of inflation.

Dividend

A variable discretionary payment made by a company to its shareholders.

NAV

The total value of a fund’s (or company’s) assets less its liabilities.

Net assets

Total assets minus any liabilities such as bank loans or creditors.

P/E Ratio

A popular ratio used to value a company’s shares, compared to other stocks, or a benchmark index. It is calculated by dividing the current share price by its earnings per share.

Share Buybacks

Where a company buys back their own shares from the market, thereby reducing the number of shares in circulation, with a consequent increase in the value of each remaining share. It increases the stake that existing shareholders have in the company, including the amount due from any future dividend payments. It typically signals the company’s optimism about the future and a possible undervaluation of the company’s equity.

Yield

The level of income on a security over a set period, typically expressed as a percentage rate. For equities, a common measure is the dividend yield, which divides recent dividend payments for each share by the share price. For a bond, this is calculated as the coupon payment divided by the current bond price. For investment trusts: Calculated by dividing the current financial year’s dividends per share (this will include prospective dividends) by the current price per share, then multiplying by 100 to arrive at a percentage figure.

Disclaimer

References made to individual securities do not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security, investment strategy or market sector, and should not be assumed to be profitable. Janus Henderson Investors, its affiliated advisor, or its employees, may have a position in the securities mentioned.

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Thank you for everyone giving up a portion of their afternoon to listen in, I really appreciate it. If we flick to the first slide, I thought I would start with giving a bit of a backdrop to the UK economy and the UK equity market. And the reason I’m doing that, because I’m not an economist, I’m a stock picker, I’m not trying to call the market, is that the UK matters to Lowland in a way that it wouldn’t necessarily matter for some of the larger cap funds in the UK income sector. And why is that? It’s because Lowland is multi-cap. What I mean by that is it invests in small, medium, as well as large companies, and those small and medium sized companies tend to have more exposure to domestic UK, so that domestic backdrop matters. To give you some numbers, Lowland would have roughly 55% of its portfolio sales here in the UK, whereas if it’s your share benchmark for Lowland would have more like 25%. So one way you could think of Lowland is having about a 30% overweight position in domestic UK. So it matters.

So I just wanted to spend a couple of slides talking about the UK before we get to Lowland itself. In terms of the economy, you can see here the chart on the left hand side is the Citigroup economic surprise index. All this means is if it’s above 0, the economic data is coming in above expectations, and if it’s below 0, the opposite, so below expectations. And if you look at the course of events, if you think back to the election this time last year, roughly this time last year, the UK economy was actually doing OK. You can see that the surprise index was comfortably in positive territory. Then after the election, you can see the relatively sharp deterioration as you get Labour saying they, they’ve had a bad economic inheritance and the speculation begins about what tax rises there are going to be and which taxes it will be. So you see the economy deteriorate in the second half of last year. But then more recently, it’s actually turned back into positive territory. You see things like Q1 GDP up 0.7% and actually expectations for the whole year are around 1%, so we look fairly well set for that. We we’re not talking about 2.5, 3% growth, we’re talking 1, 1.5% type growth, but nevertheless, what we’re not talking about, what the data is not suggesting at the moment is recession. Um, so that’s um a modestly positive economic growth backdrop. And then what the chart on the right is showing is that there are disinflationary forces. So what we’ve got here is oil price, even with, um, the Middle East happening at the weekend, the oil price is still only in the high 60s because of that spare capacity generally. We’ve seen sterling be quite strong. That should ultimately be disinflationary. What these type, uh, and just probably worth mentioning, the labour market is also suggesting some signs of cooling with um wage growth looking more moderate. What this set up means is that I think we’re likely to have further interest rate cuts. The Bank of England pretty much said as much as at its latest meeting. We’re probably looking for further interest rate cuts, all else being equal beginning in August and potentially beyond that. So the setup is modest, if not exciting, economic growth and probably more rate cuts to come. And that’s the shorter term.

I’ll look in if we flick to the next slide and look from a more long-term perspective from the UK. What we’ve seen is a de-risking of the economy over a very long period of time. So the chart on the left shows you what households have been doing. Since the financial crisis, and shows them paying off debt steadily over that time to the point where actually they’ve now tipped into net cash. And these figures include mortgage debt. So I always find it really surprising that again, you’ve got to be a bit careful. This is an average. So obviously some people have lots of savings, some people are indebted. That on average, the UK consumer now has a modest net cash position, a completely different position than they would have been in going into the financial crisis. And that, bearing in mind the consumer spending is roughly 60% of GDP, UK GDP, it means that the economy. The economy is in a more resilient place where consumers can step off the plate, you know, give them a bit more confidence or better weather, as we’ve seen recently, and they seem to be willing to, to go out and spend. And that’s what really would make the difference to the UK economy, that consumers being more willing to go out and spend. And not only are consumer balance sheets in a more resilient place, corporates and bank balance sheets are as well. And so if you look at, for example, UK corporates and look at the RNSs that come out of the stock exchange every morning, you’ll see that most of them, or a lot of their RNSs are buybacks, where corporates are generally being cautious in their capex decisions, capital expenditure decisions and are choosing to buy back shares as well. Now that’s not all good. You know, you could, if anything, do with a little bit more by way of risk appetite. But the fact is that consumer balance sheets are in a good place, corporate balance sheets are in a good place. Banks have also been pretty conservative in their lending practises. So all of this leads me to think that the UK economy is relatively resilient, low growth, but resilient.

If we flick on, so that’s the economic backdrop. What about the equity market backdrop? Um, this, this looks like one wiggly line, but what it’s basically saying is that the UK market valuation or price to earnings is roughly in line with its 20 year history, so neither looking incredibly cheap nor expensive. This is the whole market. If you were to put lowland on here, the price to earnings of lowland would be comfortably below this. It would be 10.5 times forward earnings. As of last Friday, so that’s the 20th of June. So that’s Lowland, so the UK looks sort of reasonable to OK but Lowland would be comfortably below this. If we compare it to something like the states, you know, the states would be on a low twenties PE comfortably above its long run average. And the reason that valuations matter. Because sometimes when I put up this chart, I think we failed to explain as fund managers, well, why do these numbers matter? is that history would show you, if you buy in at a low valuation, it effectively stacks the odds in your favour in terms of the long run, real return that you get at the other side. So history would suggest that if you buy in at a low teens PE, often you’ve made a, if you go back 10 years down the line to a good long term period after, you’ve made a good, you know, high single digit, low double digit, total return. Years down the line, so that’s why valuations matter, they tend to correlate with long run returns. If we then flick to the next slide. So how are UK shares or UK boards and management teams responding to the fact that their rating. Even if it’s in line with their history, its sizeably below other markets, so modestly below Europe, kind of couple of PE points below Europe, but almost half the rating of the states, and that leaves UK companies vulnerable, as we’ll talk about on the next slide. But how are company boards responding? They’re responding by buying back their own shares. The UK market has been a high dividend yield market for a long time. It’s still a 4% yield, so it’s quite an attractive dividend yield. But the new piece is the buybacks. So you can see here that the UK if you add up both the dividend and the buyback, we’re looking at a 7% roughly shareholder return per year. And you can see on the chart on the right, the number of buybacks really going exponential. The last couple of years as company boards effectively respond to their own valuations by trying to become their own net buyer. Um, and we’ve seen that extend below quite a long way down the market cap scale. So even smaller companies that we invest in for Lowland, the likes of Epine, just to give you an example, which is a window and door frame manufacturer, it’s roughly 150 million market cap. They’re buying back their shares almost every day. Because they think they’re undervalued. Um, so this is definitely the trend that we’re seeing in quite a concerted way. Again, it’s not, this isn’t, I’m not presenting this as all good. Actually, in a way, it would be preferable if some of these companies were spending on capital expenditure instead. And what, what’s probably needed for that to happen is for the UK market to re-rate so that they have, uh, so that the buyback doesn’t look like such a compelling use of their, of their cash, and actually it’d be better possibly if they were spending more on capital expenditure.

If we flick to the next slide and why these companies feel vulnerable, it’s because M&A, in other words, takeover activity in the UK, has really stepped up a gear in the last couple of years, uh, and carried on this, this calendar as well. So for Lowland, in our financial year that’s passed, so to the end of September last year, we were getting a takeover offer for Lowland roughly every 2 months, and the ones in bold listed here are the ones that we held in Lowland. So the likes of IDS, which was better known as Royal Mail, Time in, which is a doorknobs, door handles company, Alpha Financial Markets Consulting, which is a financial consulting business, and Nis, which was taken over by Deutsche Bank, you know, the list goes on and even very recently we’ve had in the space of the last month or month and a half, two takeover offers. One for H&T which was a pawnbroker, and that’s agreed to be taken over by an international peer, and one for Reynolds, which is an industrial chain business that’s being taken over by private equity.

I think what that shows is that you hear a lot of UK fund managers, me included, going out there publicly saying, we think UK equities are cheap, you know, this whole portfolio’s on 10 times earnings. But there is external validation of that in the sheer amount of M&A interest that we are seeing, you know, something like Reynolds, even at the bid price, which was comfortably above the undisturbed price, it’s still trading on a low teens PE. H&T, the pawnbroker, would be the same. The bid price is still on a low teens PE and I think that demonstrates just the sheer amount of value opportunity there is at the small and midcap end of the UK market.

If we then flick on to Lowland itself, so that’s given you a bit of a backdrop to the UK economy and the UK equity market. Let’s get on to Lowland. A couple of very basic facts before we get off. If 75% of you are shareholders listening to this, I think you’ll know this, so apologies if I’m telling you things you already know, but it’s the circa 350 million net assets that sits within the UK income sector. It pays roughly 4.5% dividend yield, and it has never cut its dividend on an annual basis since it was founded in the 1960s. The key difference from Lowland versus the rest of the UK income sector is that it is multi-cap. In other words, it invests in small and medium as well as large companies.

We can see the index breakdown here, where we’ve got just under half the portfolio in the FTSE 100. If anything, that’s more than we would have historically, so I would expect over time that FTSE 100 rate is likely to come down and we would reallocate that towards small and midcap, but we are always multi-cap. You know, you can see here, the FTSE 100 is now 85% of the FTSE all-share compared to our 50, so we’re substantially overweight, small and medium-sized companies. But we’re not multi-cap for the sake of it. There’s a reason for investing more in small and midcap, and it’s that these companies are faster growing over the very long run. These small and medium-sized companies are at an earlier stage of their life cycle, so can grow more, grow more sales, earnings, and ultimately dividends. And so Lowland historically would have been one of the faster dividend growth trusts in the sector because it invested more in these faster-growing small and medium-sized companies.

And if I look, for example, today, in the forecast that we do, even though Lowland has a lower valuation in the UK market, we think it will do higher sales and higher earnings growth despite being on a lower valuation, which I think again reflects that valuation opportunity that’s there in small and mid-cap at the moment. So we’re going multi-cap because we think we’ll get faster sales and earnest growth dividend growth, but also to diversify, you know, from an income fund perspective, it diversifies the income beyond just those largest UK companies that I think would be familiar to everyone on the call, the likes of GlaxoSmithKline, the likes of HSBC to diversify away from that income. The small midcap is helpful for that. And actually, I think there’s more income in the small and mid-cap area than people necessarily realize and I’ll give a few stock examples later. So if we then flick on, again, a few sort of basic facts, all the active share is saying is that we are fundamentally very different from the benchmarks, so you shouldn’t expect us to perform close to if it’s your share. That active share means basically 70% of the trust is different from the benchmark. And we want to use the investment trust structure in the best way possible. So what do I really mean by that? I mean, make the dividend predictable in a way that would be very challenging in an open-ended fund. If you were to pull up the quarterly dividend for Lowland, you would see that we, we don’t cut the quarterly dividend payment. So our last quarterly dividend was 1.65%. If you just take that number, multiply it by 4 cos it’s quarterly, you’d get 6.5, 6.6% dividend, which gets you to a 4.5% yield. So we’re trying to make it very easy for, we know that a lot of our end investors want to have income that’s predictable, whether it’s for school fees, etc. So we try and make it very predictable for that. It would be, I run an open-ended fund as well. It’s very difficult to get your income forecastable in the same way in an open-ended vehicle. So that’s one element. Another element is gearing. You should expect us almost always to deploy gearing in this trust. It’s a mixture of a private placement that’s long dated, along with a revolving credit facility, but we will almost always use gearing because we think that equities will generate a good real total return over time. The only exception to that, and this is a bit before my time, just before I came on, is that James Henderson, who I worked with, took this trust to net cash in the period just before the financial crisis, because he thought that the valuations looked stretched. So we will occasionally bring the gearing down, but only in pretty extreme circumstances like that, and we’re certainly not in that place at the moment, given where valuations are.

Uh, I think one other thing that I should say in terms of using the investment trust structure is the types of small and medium-sized companies that we’re investing in for lowland would these days be quite challenging to hold or hold themselves in an open-ended vehicle. So having that closed pool of assets is, is a great structure for being able to invest in smaller companies. If we then flick on to talk a bit about the investment process, this is very much a value-driven process, um, we’re quite contrarian, we pay attention to valuations, but there is no one valuation metric that we use across the entire portfolio. So I’ve given three examples here because there are different valuation metrics we use for each. Uh, one is Aberdeen, uh, which is a relatively new holding this calendar year that we bought on the back of a new CEO coming in. The reason we bought Aberdeen is effectively some of the parts optionality. So what do I mean by that? Aberdeen owns Interactive Investor, one of the investment platforms. I’m sure some people uh use Interactive Investor. It’s gaining a lot of customers. It’s growing quickly. When people hear Aberdeen, they think it’s the fund management business, and they, they forget that actually interactive is a very valuable asset within that group. So some of the parts is how we think about Aberdeen.

Hamerson, which is a, a, It invests in retail sites sort of uh bullring in Birmingham’s probably one of the best examples, and actually, No one’s really put off a shopping centre in a, in a long time, so finally there’s some tightness in that market and some rental growth. How do we value Hampton? Is it a discount to its net asset value of almost 30% in what could turn out to be the trough point in that net asset value. Um, so we’d be thinking about that relative to its NAV and also it pays an attractive 5% plus dividend yield. So we’d be thinking about that as well. For STV, which is the Scottish version of ITV, we would be looking at price to earnings and dividend yields, and it’s one of those, um, nice value opportunities, we think, where the, the PE and the dividend yield are one and the same. So it’s a roughly, uh, 7 times PE, roughly 70% dividend yield. So there, it is a value process, but there would be different value valuation metrics that we use depending on the whole.

And in terms of how we are identifying new positions, a lot of it would be on the back of meeting the management team. Uh, so as I mentioned, Aberdeen was one that we didn’t hold before the new CEO came into place. And that will often be the trigger point for us building a holding. Um, and we will start small. So this is a long list fund, this is not a shortlist high conviction fund. We have roughly 100 holdings. That is not unusual for Lowland. Uh, just to be clear, me and James are not trying to cover 100 companies ourselves. At the larger cap end, so that roughly 50%, just under 50%. That we hold in the FTSE 100. Janus Henderson has almost 40 sector-specific analysts, and has multiple different teams, whether it’s covering property equities, um, European equities, etc. So we can use the expertise within Janus Henderson, particularly at the larger company and just to give some comfort that we’re not trying to cover 100 companies between the two of us.

If we then flick on to talk about performance, and these figures are to the end of May. We’ve had a reasonably good June, so we’re now at the time of the time of filming, so things do change. We’re now ahead over 13, and 5 years. And if I look at this, I’m talking in any of these terms, but the possibly the same. If I look at what’s driving that on a shorter term basis, so say the one year, one year to date numbers takeovers have definitely been helpful, the likes of Reynold being among them, the likes of Babcock, which is not a takeover, it’s a defense supplier, but that has also been a good performer. In an environment of rising defense spending, in a more uncertain world, the 5-year number is probably more relevant because that’s, that’s more our time horizon, you know, we invest with, if we’re taking a position in something like in Aberdeen, we’re not thinking 6 months, we’re thinking 3 to 5 years, so I focus on the 5-year number for a sec.

That outperformance has not been driven by small and mid-cap outperforming, it’s actually been the opposite, small and mid-cap has been a headwind to performance for us, and a substantial one for a couple of years, but the stock. So that allowed us to effectively weather that wind in our face. We’ve managed to outperform and what’s driven that has been the likes of Babcock. It’s been the likes of some of the smaller companies that some of which no longer are listed on the market. So something like K3 Capital would have been a good performer, at the large cap end. Some turnaround stories like M&S uh have been very helpful. M&S actually we no longer hold in Logan, we sold it a couple of months ago, but we held M&S, um, through that turnaround. I hope they carry on with their success, but it’s probably a bit better understood now.

Um, so something like M&S was, was actually our biggest relative contributor, um, over that 5-year time period. Uh, if we click on. Just a bit on the dividend. If you go, so this is a 30-year period, over this 30-year period, the dividend has grown at roughly 6.5%, um, so it’s comfortably above inflation. They said it’s never been cut, but the reason you don’t see Lowland sometimes in these dividend hero type lists is that the dividend was held, uh, for one year during the financial crisis. So obviously, in hindsight, it would have been really helpful if we put it up sort of 0.1 of a penny, and then we would have been on the dividend hero list, but. Nonetheless, the, the dividend has never been cut, and like I said, we try and make it really predictable for people.

Um, one thing I would mention on this chart is that, you know, no prizes for, for seeing when the dividend flattens off and it’s during COVID because small and medium-sized companies cut their dividends very substantially during COVID, but Lowland didn’t because we chose to use the trust structure. But effectively the trust has gone through a couple of years of growing back into the dividend that it had pre-COVID. And we’ve now gone through that phase and the dividend was covered two years ago, not quite covered last year, but only because we had one XD date shift to the right, which was rather frustrating. But we are trying to cover the dividend with natural income, and most of the years we do manage it. I’m only saying that because I know there’s a bit of a trend at the moment for dividends to be paid out of capital. That is not the case with Lowlands. This is largely a natural yield from the portfolio. If we flick on, I think I’ve largely covered this, but just in terms of valuation, how to think about it. So going back to the very, well, not quite the beginning, but a couple of slides ago, the UK market isn’t out of whack with its history, but so it’s neither cheap nor expensive. Lowland would sit below that in terms of its valuation and the trust itself is at a discount of around 7%. So you could think of it as being a couple of layers of valuation discount. So the trust is at a discount and Lowland itself. Is it a discount?

If you then click on. I think, I think we’ve covered covered this really, that small and medium-sized companies haven’t, haven’t outperformed, so no, no one, you know, if you’re watching this thinking, oh, I’ve missed that sort of small image cap outperformance, it hasn’t really happened yet, um. But what I thought was worth touching on is that some of the pushback that I get when you’re comparing something like a lowland to, say, a more global fund that invests more in the States, is that, so the challenge I get is, does the UK actually have good companies to invest in, you know, does the UK have growth companies? And I think it does, but I think they look different to how they do in the states. So do we have, you know, an alphabet? No. But actually, these two companies here, you’ve given the last 15 years of performance, and in both cases you’ve gone from 1 pound to 89 pounds in businesses that if you described them, would not sound glamorous or exciting at all. So Helen Smith is galvanizing, in other words, keeping things in sync to stop them from rusting. Um, Cranswick is pork and now chicken processing. Uh, so not remotely glamorizing, extremely normal businesses, but that have delivered extraordinary returns over the last 15 years or so. Both of these, by the way, are held in, in Lowland. These companies would have kept up with the S&P in terms of their total return. How they’ve managed that is investing year in, year out, in organic and inorganic growth in the case of Hunt Smith. So Cranswick would spend comfortably over 100 million every single year on CapEx, and it has continued to automate. It’s the market leader, it’s the best invested by along the way, and that’s how it’s managed to just compound steadily over time. So if you were to pull them up in any one year, do they look super exciting compared to the, you know, the Microsofts of the world? No. But they’ve delivered incredible returns over time, and I think this is the kind of company that we do have in the UK, um, so that view, and, and they’re, they’re more likely to be found, by the way, in the small and medium sized company area because that’s where they still have more scope to grow. So that’s why I think, yes, Molica has underperformed and had a tough time, but these types of companies do exist in the UK. You just need to be willing to look down the market cap scale in order to find them. If we then click on to where we’ve been adding, so this is a couple of stock examples, I’m happy to talk in more detail if anyone has questions about these. Um, the one that’s front of mind for me at the moment is Norcross, only because I met the CEO and CFO a couple of days ago, and we, and we’ve been adding it’s roughly 1% of Lowland at the moment. So something like Norcross is the UK market leader in bathroom supplies. Again, not a glamorous business, um, but it would. Supply things like electric showers, um, shower enclosures, that kind of thing. It’s a bit like Howden’s, uh, the kitchens, but the, the bathrooms and much, much more. The, the UK business would make a 15% margin, so perfectly good margin business. Um, grow steadily, but not fast. And would do bolt-ons, um, so some, some bolt on deals and sort of steadily grow through that route as well. The shares trade on. 89 times earnings, they pay a very comfortably covered 4% dividend yield. Honestly, it goes without saying this is not a stock recommendation. I’m just saying that these are the types of companies that you can find in the smaller mid-cap area through doing a little bit of, of digging. And that company is, is perfectly well managed and in my view, that type of valuation, um, is attractive for that type of market-leading 15% margin type business.

So if we then click onto the portfolio itself, this is only the top 20, so it potentially doesn’t get across um the true flavor of Lowland cos it, as I said, we’ve got 100 companies, so this is, this is more of a snapshot of the portfolio. You can see that there are some very traditional income fund names in there, likes of HSBC GSK, but there’s also some more smaller midcap names. So for example, FBD is an Irish agricultural insurer, um, we’ve got the likes of IPF which is, um, consumer lending in emerging markets, this is like Mexico and Eastern Europe. Um, Epine, which is, as I mentioned, doors and window frames, so it’s a mixture of the large cap which I’m sure you’ve seen in in lots of top tens of UK income funds and more esoteric names. And so finally, and then I’ve left lots of time for questions deliberately, uh, nothing in here that’ll take you by surprise, but you’ve got multiple layers of discount here, the trust is at a discount, the portfolio is at a discount to in itself, reasonably valued UK equity market, um, and within the. it’s, it’s small and midcap that’s that’s sizeably underperformed, and this trust has the flexibility to take advantage of that, which is great. It would definitely be more challenging and an open-ended vehicle. At the same time, you’re getting a 4.5% dividend yield that we hope will be fully covered. With decent growth, so I will stop there and hopefully we will have some questions. Thanks very much for that, Laura, very interesting. Can I just remind delegates, if you want to ask a question, just click the Q and A button, which you’ll find towards the bottom of your screen, and you can just type in your question. We do have some questions. The first one concerns Cyber Capital. Are they still on the shareholder register, and if so, has the board had any dialogue with them? So they were never, well, how can you put this? There’s been no dialogue. They don’t tend to respond to dialogue. OK. It’s hard to know, to be totally honest, it’s hard to know where they are sometimes on registers because it’s not always in their name. We think if they are there, they’re minimal now. Right. Thank you. OK.

You mentioned earlier that businesses may reduce their buybacks when their valuations improve, but isn’t a bigger factor the business’s view on the return on capital they can obtain by investing in the business rather than buying back shares? In other words, their view on the economic outlook. I think the best way was we don’t own Next, but Next are actually brilliant communicators, and they recently put out a statement that says. So their PE, their price earnings is now high teens. They’ve done very well as shares. They’re very well managed. So they got to a high teens PE and they put out a statement that said, actually, the return, we’re stopping our buyback because the return on the buyback now doesn’t meet our required hurdle rates. And they can choose to invest, so they might invest more elsewhere. They might pay a special dividend. I don’t know, I don’t own Next, but I thought that was a brilliant way of them communicating that they are paying attention to the different returns on different uses of cash.

So what I took from that statement is that if we saw the whole of the UK market then re-rate in the way that we’ve seen Next re-rate, and maybe that’s a bit optimistic to get to the highs. We’re a long way away from that. But if that was to happen, then if companies were rational allocators of capital, they would say, OK, we’re not gonna do that buyback anymore. We’ll look at spending more on Capex. I think at the moment, the hurdle rate because valuations are so low, the temptation to do buybacks, especially when they’re seen as low risk and you’ve got lots of investors telling you to do a buyback, that is the favored option. If you suddenly saw the ratings look quite different, I think you’d see more companies choosing to spend money elsewhere, whether it’s organic or inorganic. Right, thanks.

There are two further questions which are broadly the same thing. So the slide that you showed in your monthly fact sheet shows that you’ve outperformed over 13 and 5 years but underperformed over 10 years. What happened in that period? It’s a very astute question, Brexit, basically. So Lowland is more exposed to that domestic economy and much more so than its benchmark and its peer group. So whereas a lot of the peer group are invested in the large cap end of UK equities that following Brexit were relatively well insulated, you know, the Unilever and GSK’s of the world, Brexit doesn’t make too much of a difference to them. It might mean a bit on the global currency, but where it really de-rated, where Brexit hit worst by far was the domestic companies, and they went through a de-rating following Brexit that they haven’t really come out of, and it hurt Lowland so much more than its peer group. And in hindsight, we were complacent about Brexit, you know, we were among the people that thought, oh this, you know, look at the polls, this won’t happen. And then when it did happen, we didn’t foresee the sort of drip, drip of G rating over a very long period of time. And companies reached valuations that we didn’t think that they would rationally do and then we’re only quite recently coming out the other side of that, so it’s a good question and that’s what happened.

Yeah, that’s clear. Um, so, in that vein, I don’t know whether you did actually mention it in a slide, but what proportion of the trust is currently invested in small stroke, midcap names versus the large caps? You can think of it’s roughly 50/50 for rounding. So it’s roughly 50% in the FTSE 100, and then the other 50% in small and midcap. There’s a tiny, tiny bit overseas in the Lowland, but it’s Ireland. It’s those two Irish holdings, one of which is FBD, which is an insurer, and one of which is Irish Continental, which is the varies between Holyhead and Dublin. But everything else is the UK, so it’s roughly 50/50. Mhm. Thank you.

So just remind people, this is your opportunity to, to ask Laura any questions you may have. So if you’ve got any further questions, please ask them now, otherwise we’ll draw proceedings to a close if no one else has any, has any further questions. Um, it would seem not, so, uh, I just have to say thank you very much, Laura, it’s been great, and you’ve touched and appreciated. It was a very interesting presentation. Actually, sorry, there’s one further thing I would ask is talk about buybacks. Uh, is Lowland itself buying back its shares at the moment, given the discount? And yes we are, we’ve brought back roughly 15% of our shares calendar year to date. It’s a relatively new, um, buyback for the trust, and, but what we’re trying to do is effectively tighten the share register going a bit to someone’s previous question, um. We’ve taken some shareholders off the register as part of that buyback, and we think that we’re now in a more stable, um, point on the shareholder register. So what I would hope is that from now on, that share buybacks would slow down because we’ve gone through that period now. OK. Right, well, thanks very much, Laura, I very much appreciated.

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